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Weakened States and Market Giants: 




This article argues that the contemporaneous phenomana of the ‘third wave 
of democratisations’ and the ‘second wave of liberalisations’ – or neoliberalism 
as it were – has disrupted the promise of democracy in the Global South. 
While the mainstream literature considers that democracy and the promotion 
of open market economies are mutually reinforcing, I claim that they in fact 
clash around the roles of the state, which both democracy and neoliberalism 
seek to reform, but in opposite directions. Democracy requires a broadened 
and responsive state system, mediating between social classes, while neoliberal 
reform typically shrinks the state system and shapes it to the preferences of 
elite classes. In this article, this thesis is explored in historical and comparative 
ways. I build an analytical framework through a comparison between the 
Bolivian National Revolution of 1952 and the democratic reforms undertaken 
under Evo Morales. Using this tool, I compare the fraught relations of Niger 
with French nuclear giant Areva and those of West Bengal with Indian 
industrial giant Tata. These comparisons, developed following descriptions 
of historical backgrounds, show why the vexed issue of the reform of the state 
should constitute a central research agenda if we are to grasp the fundamental 
conditions of the prospects of democracy in the Global South today.
Résumé
Cet article affirme que la coïncidence de la « troisième vague de 
démocratisations » avec la « deuxième vague de libéralisations » – 
néolibéralisme – a bouleversé les promesses de démocratie dans les pays du 
Sud. Alors que la littérature traditionnelle considère que la démocratie et la 
promotion d'économies de marchés ouverts se renforcent mutuellement, 
nous pensons qu'en réalité, elles s’affrontent sur les rôles de l'État, que la 
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démocratie et le néolibéralisme tentent de réformer, mais dans des directions 
opposées. La démocratie nécessite un système étatique élargi et réactif, 
assurant la médiation entre les classes sociales, tandis que, généralement, 
la réforme néolibérale rétrécit le système étatique et le façonne selon les 
préférences des classes élitistes. Dans cet article, cette thèse est explorée 
de manière historique et comparative. Nous construisons un cadre 
analytique en comparant la révolution nationale bolivienne de 1952 aux 
réformes démocratiques entreprises sous Evo Morales. Utilisant cet outil, 
nous comparons les difficiles relations du Niger avec le géant nucléaire 
français, Areva, et celles du Bengale occidental avec le géant industriel 
indien Tata. Ces comparaisons, développées à la suite de descriptions de 
contextes historiques, justifient la constitution d’un programme central de 
recherche sur l’épineuse question de la réforme de l’État si nous voulons 
saisir les conditions fondamentales des perspectives de la démocratie dans 
les pays du Sud.
Introduction
The ‘third wave of democratisation’ coincided with a ‘second wave’ of 
economic liberalism. The story of the democracy ‘waves’ – as detailed 
by Huntington (1991) – shows the first one surging from the American 
suffrage extensions of the early nineteenth century and ebbing with the 
advent of fascism in Europe in the 1920s. Allied victory led to a second, 
20-year-long wave, which includes India (the ‘second wave’ democracy case 
in this study); and a third wave took momentum after Portugal’s ‘carnation 
revolution’ of 1974, extending to countries in Latin America, Asia, Eastern 
Europe and finally Africa, up to the mid-1990s. This story accounts for 
the fact that, starting somewhere in the mid-1970s, political conditions 
gradually changed or shifted in many parts of the world in favour of some 
form of political liberalisation, mostly taking the shape of a revival of 
representative democracy. In the Global South particularly – in Asia, Latin 
America and Africa – this was to a decisive extent the result of the fact that 
authoritarian models of state-led development were failing on many scores. 
Where the economic engine of the model performed more satisfactorily, 
the authoritarian nature of state leadership created serious problems.1 
In the more numerous cases where economic performance was dismal, 
the political oppressions of authoritarianism added to economic misery. 
Whichever the case, increasing numbers of people saw authoritarianism, 
or more specifically, the lack of political participation, as the root cause of 
the problem. A democratic reform of the state appeared to be the solution 
in places as different as Bolivia and Niger – two of the three cases studied 
in this article.
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At roughly the same time, as noted above, a wave of liberal economic 
reforms trickled out of institutions in Washington DC in the late 1970s, 
quickly gathering sufficient thrust to sweep through most countries in the 
Global South by the mid-1990s. Historically, an earlier age of liberalism 
had ruled the economy in many countries from the mid-1850s to the Great 
Depression2 and the newer one was accordingly named ‘neoliberalism’. 
The proponents of this neoliberal reform diagnosed that there was a fatal 
problem with the authoritarian model of state-led development that was 
then hegemonic in the Global South. But while advocates of democratic 
reform targeted the authoritarian part of the proposition, neoliberal reforms 
focused instead on its state-led segment. 
It therefore so happened that, by the early 1980s, two reform agendas 
emerged in the Global South: one which was broadly based on domestic 
movements, and sought a democratic reform of the state, demanding the 
end of authoritarianism together with increased political participation in 
the ‘state system’ (see below); and the other which largely came from the 
outside and pushed for neoliberal reform of the state, insisting on an end of 
its stewardship of development and on a free rein for ‘market forces’.
So, while the target of the two reform agendas was the same – the state 
– their objectives were very different and even, to some significant extent, 
incompatible. They were, at any rate, in competition, and the success of 
the one would scuttle the progress of the other.3 Democratic and neoliberal 
reforms did not – and still do not – have compatible goals regarding the role 
of the state. The empirical record shows that the two reform agendas were not 
originally promoted by the same actors, nor did they rest on the same vision 
of the role of the state, much to the contrary. For the democracy promoters, 
key implications include the winding down of the state’s repressive capacities 
and the preservation of its ‘developmental’ ones – meaning that the state 
was to remain a political engine capable of transforming the structure of 
the economy through direct involvement of its specific powers; for the 
promoters of neoliberalism, on the other hand, the imperative was for the 
state to create the conditions for market expansion, a mission which may 
well entail an overhaul of its repressive apparatus, at least at some early stage. 
To better clarify the significance of these and related implications, a brief 
theoretical analysis is in order. 
Here, I draw especially on aspects of neo-Marxist perspectives on the 
state as developed by Ralph Milliband (2009 [1969]) as well as on the brief 
synthesis later provided by Robert Solo (1978). I am principally interested in 
their view of the state as a system of power made of several ‘functional elements’ 
that are operated firstly to create – through a degree of autonomy – a state of 
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equilibrium among social classes, but ultimately to further the overarching 
interests of the dominant class(es). In the case of Milliband, such functional 
elements include government, but also ‘the civil service, the complex of public 
agencies, the military, the judiciary, and the police’ (summarised by Solo 1978: 
832). Such a concept of the state as a system of power has – for my purposes 
– at least two important dimensions: first, it prevents us from understanding 
state power as limited to itself and situated above all other forms of power 
intervening in the polity; and second, and more importantly, it is also helpful 
in evaluating the magnitude of state power, and the fine grain of the changes 
that can be made to increase or decrease that magnitude in relation to a set of 
objectives – such as happened in the interlocking courses of democratic and 
neoliberal reforms in the Global South. 
Combined with a comparative synopsis of two major experiences of 
democratic reform in Bolivia – the National Revolution of 1952 and the 
current, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) attempt – this understanding 
of neo-Marxist theories of the state will be used to develop a conceptual 
framework on state reform agendas. The key elements of the framework will 
then be applied to an analysis of two case studies from Niger and the Indian 
states of West Bengal and Gujarat. So the comparison is chiefly between 
Niger and India, with Bolivia supplying only an exemplary story for building 
the theoretical fodder used in the case studies. Why Niger and India? The 
empirical challenge for this study was to find cases that are different in 
terms of geographic location, yet similar in terms of political system and 
reform policy. The difference of geographic location is a proxy for the more 
substantial – as far as the objectives of the study are concerned – difference 
of historical process and its implications for our times, which is why the 
South-South Research Consortium that funded the research project behind 
this article suggested that authors should compare cases across, rather than 
within, the three Southern continents. On the other hand, the significance of 
my study derives also from a comparison between democratic and neoliberal 
reform. This means that the selected cases should both have undergone such 
reforms in one way or another. Not many countries in Asia correspond to 
this description: either countries have known democratic but no neoliberal 
reform (South Korea, Taiwan), or they have known neither democratic nor 
neoliberal reform (most of South Asia). India was the only clear case in the 
circumstance, but its processes being of a complexity that evidently defies 
the parameters of a comparison with Niger, I have found more useful to 
break them down into an internal comparative case study focusing on West 
Bengal and Gujarat. Niger was chosen precisely for the apparent simplicity 
and linearity of its trajectory, which make for an economical examination 
of the issues at hand.
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Bolivian Lessons: Towards a Conceptual Framework
In 2006, Bolivians started, under President Morales, a radical democratic 
reform of their politics. A new constitution adopted in 2009 reinvented the 
country as a ‘plurinational state’.4 To this ostensibly ‘post-liberal-democracy’5 
evolution, MAS appended an ambitious National Development Plan 
grounded in the uplifting principles of Dignity, Sovereignty, Productivity 
and a Democracy of Living Well. The constitution and the plan organise 
a full political and economic framework with which to reform the Bolivian 
state in the name of democracy, and against the neoliberal reform that had 
been in force since the early 1980s. Vice-President García Linera (2006; 
García Linera and Ortega Breña 2010) provided – and continues to provide 
– sophisticated and influential analyses of the process, while on 1 May 
2011, Morales signed a presidential decree intended to ‘bury’ the one from 
1985 which had launched neoliberal reform.
Although these moves and measures ostensibly intend to overturn 
the neoliberal reform of the state of the past three decades, many serious 
analyses suggest that they have in fact simply ‘reconstituted’ (in the 
words of Jeffery Webber (2011)) the neoliberal state. The brief version 
of the story could run thus: by the late 1990s to early 2000s, the failure 
of neoliberalism to solve Bolivia’s social and economic predicament had 
become so endemic that the country was once more in a state of prolonged 
crisis. Especially the privatisation of hydrocarbons had shorn the state 
of revenue, and in the early 2000s, it found itself unable to stave off the 
calamitous consequences of – among other things – coca eradication and the 
Argentinian economic collapse (Kohl and Farthing 2009; Farthing 2010). 
Escalating crises and social conflicts destroyed the presidency of Sánchez 
de Lozada and led to a referendum on the nationalisation of hydrocarbons 
in July 2004. The referendum sought (in the words of President Carlos 
Mesa) a ‘relegitimisation’6 of the state through reviving some of the policy 
orientations that obtained before neoliberalism. However, only MAS 
garnered the political power base needed to implement its key outcome, 
the nationalisation of hydrocarbons. Yet, after this was done the constraints 
created by the preceding neoliberal politico-economic regime effectively led 
MAS to conduct what Kaup terms a ‘neoliberal nationalization’: ‘While it 
technically returned physical control of Bolivia’s natural gas to the state, the 
space opened up for private investment in the hydrocarbon sector in the 
1980s and 1990s still exists. Transnational firms still extract the majority 
of Bolivia’s natural gas, and most of it is still sent to more profitable export 
markets’ (Kaup 2010: 135). (I.e., instead of supporting the industrialisation 
agenda the referendum propounded.)
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As has been pointed out by various critics, this turn of events seems 
to generally characterise MAS efforts at democratic reform. James Petras 
(2013) thus stresses that MAS has consistently stuck to largely orthodox 
economic policies. Social spending, public investment, pay raises for public 
sector workers all remain at very modest levels, while banks and businesses 
have been benefiting from the embrace of low taxes, stable currency and 
government blandishments – up to and including resisting strikes and labour 
pressures. The government holds on to foreign reserves earned through the 
export of boom-time commodities and increased royalties, a policy that 
better serves the purpose of luring foreign investors with the possibility of 
accessing hard currencies than that of investing in the internal economy. In 
the same vein, infrastructure spending has been chiefly aimed at facilitating 
transport of agro-mineral exports, a constant of Bolivia’s various historical 
eras of liberal ascendancy. A similar orthodoxy-abidance is clearly noticeable 
in MAS’s investment and labour policies, to the extent that, as a conclusion 
to his indictment, Petras labelled Morales a ‘radical conservative’ (2013), 
i.e., someone who cloaks conservative policies with radical affirmations. If 
using more moderate language, similar criticism has been levelled by various 
authors (Cunha Filio, Gonçalves and Dalla Déa 2010; Regalsky and Ortega 
Breña 2010; Webber 2011), with Webber mounting a solid case of Morales’ 
governance as ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’.
Maybe such assessments are too severe. Given MAS’s clear thrust 
toward democratic reform, they may simply reveal that this agenda is being 
stemmed by the sturdier legacies of neoliberalism. It is useful, in this light, 
to contrast MAS’s relative failures (for now) with the outcome of Bolivia’s 
first effort at democratic reform, the National Revolution of 1952, which 
did succeed in transforming Bolivia’s society while creating a new state, 
famously known as the Estado del ’52 (‘the state of ’52’).7 A brief comparison 
between democratic reform then and now may begin to put us on the track 
of understanding the nature of the limitations of MAS’s attempt at offering 
to present-day Bolivians the fresh start they received from the Estado del ’52.
The events leading up to the arrival of MAS and of the Movimiento 
Nacionalisto Revolucionario (MNR) to power respectively in 2004 and in 
1952 were both marked by a structural crisis of the economy and violent 
conflict at the societal level. In particular, the novelty in 1952 was the rapid 
politicisation of labour (workers and peasants) as a result of the collapse of 
the elite order, after the Great Depression destabilised tin capitalism, and the 
Chaco War debilitated the military. In a clear sense, it was oligarchy (the tin 
barons and the so-called rosca state that served them) and autocracy (military 
leaders) giving way, for the first time in Bolivia’s already long independent 
history, to democracy (workers, peasants and nationalist leaders). From an 
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analytical point of view, what happened was the convergence of a certain 
kind of political will from the top – that is, within the MNR leadership – 
and of a certain kind of popular agency from below, agreeing on a political 
programme of democratic reform (universal vote, nationalisation of mines 
and agrarian reform) and using certain transformative institutions (the 
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), the Ministerio de Asuntos 
Campesinos and the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) to execute the 
programme. These institutions were meeting-ground organisations, in the 
sense that they created a space of close collaboration between state agents and 
labour representatives.8 All four elements – political will, popular agency, 
agreed-upon reform programme and meeting-ground institutions – had 
been necessary and sufficient to the initial success of the revolution, that is, 
the reform of the state so that it became capable of large-scale nationalisation 
of mines, wide-ranging land distribution and, more generally, efficient 
stewardship of the welfare of the larger population.9 This process in turn 
put an end to the cycle of Bolivian history that started when the gradual rise 
of mining capitalism – going back to the presidency of Linares, 1857–61 – 
made Bolivia a poster child of classical-liberal economic governance. 
Ideological divergences and pressures from its enemy within and without 
compromised the revolution before it set Bolivia on a definitive course.10 
The arrival of neoliberalism in the 1980s was, to a significant extent, a 
literal reversal of history: economic liberalism – recognisable under a 
new garb – was reasserting its pre-eminence against what was clearly its 
antagonist – democracy. 
In these changed conditions, by the early 2000s, Bolivia was again in a 
state of crisis strongly reminiscent of the one which preceded the National 
Revolution. The new oligarchy proved even more brittle than the older rosca-
supported one, and the piling up of social catastrophes traceable directly to 
neoliberal-inspired policies triggered a collapse in state legitimacy marked 
by unprecedented violence.11 Similar also to the period leading up to 1952, 
there was a new type of popular mobilisation brewing in the country, in this 
case, that of politicised indigenous and mestizos groups. Thus, in general, 
the story of MAS’s rise to power shows the presence of at least three of the 
four key elements detected as crucial for the success of reform in that of the 
MNR: political will from above, popular agency from below, and agreement 
around a programme of democratic reform. 
This did not take shape without often tense – and occasionally murderous 
– conflicts, but as a final element, the MAS process added a ‘transformative 
constitution’ (Sunstein 2001) rather than the transformative institutions 
that were a hallmark of the MNR reforms. This particular fact is key. It 
shows that the reform undertaken by MAS is not directly aimed at the state. 
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The constitution establishes new legal norms for the relations of state and 
society, but although it can legislate the action of state power, it does not 
organise new functional elements (such as COMIBOL or the Ministry of 
Peasant Affairs in 1952) that would transform the magnitude of state power 
in support of a new class equilibrium, or in the service of a new dominant 
class.12 It must be noted on this latter score that if reforming the state 
means, in this framework, building new organisations and getting them 
to work according to plans, neoliberal reform has been a simpler species 
of reform of the state: it has mainly consisted in removing, rather than 
building organisations. Overturning this process against the constraints – in 
state capacities especially – that it has created is the defining challenge of a 
democratic reform of the state after neoliberalism. 
Equipped with these lessons, I now turn to the case studies, and, in the 
conflictual situations that are presented, I will discuss especially whether 
or not elements of political will, popular agency, a reform programme and 
transformative institutions tend to come into play, why, and with what 
implications for potential democratic reform. 
The two case studies are about relations of states with market giants 
– Niger and Areva NC, West Bengal/Gujarat and Tata Motors – but my 
interest is not focused on the details of these relations. The cases have 
been selected on the basis of the light that they may shed especially on the 
power of the state following neoliberal reform, and given the peculiar social 
conditions in which they develop. In both cases, the four elements of the 
conceptual framework described above will be tested against the specific 
contextual elements of the case, and a short assessment will be drawn. 
Following this, I draw a brief conclusion on the meaning of the study for 
the issue of democratic reform in the Global South.
Niger: Rekindling the Social Contract
The Nigerien state was ‘restructured’ by neoliberal reform in the period 1982–
98. Independent from France in 1960, the state saw prevailing revenue sources 
dry up in the early 1970s, when the great Sahel drought reduced the country’s 
agriculture to a shambles and tropical commodities, such as groundnuts, 
Niger’s primary export, lost much of their market value. But Niger’s subsoil 
held large amounts of high quality uranium ore that had come online in 
1968, and there was a mounting global trend in uranium consumption – 
significantly energised mid-decade by the oil shocks – which brightened 
the state’s prospects, especially after 1974. In April of that year, military 
men had toppled the single party regime of the Parti Progressiste Nigérien 
(PPN), in the wake of rural famine and the general economic crisis that was 
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gripping the country. The windfall of uranium revenue led to ambitious 
plans of creating a ‘société de développement’ (‘development society’) one 
which would be based on defeating the spectre of hunger, transforming 
agriculture and improving education and health. Though authoritarian, the 
regime envisaged this development society to take shape through a gradual 
democratic reform of the state.13 In the meantime, it drastically increased the 
rate of public investment, which grew to 27 per cent of GDP and spawned 
several new public enterprises, rural development projects and infrastructure 
overhaul agendas. Much of the new investment also went into infrastructure 
for mining, and the regime created an expert-led organisation, the Office 
National des Ressources Minières (ONAREM) to both prospect the territory 
and oversee the state’s interests in existing operations (such as the French-led 
exploitation of uranium in the desert north). 
Time was not on the side of the Nigerien state, however. While it 
took advantage of the easy international lending period of the late 1970s, 
guaranteed by its uranium revenue, the latter rapidly plummeted by the 
end of the decade. Soon, Niger found itself saddled with enormous debt, 
shorn of the best part of its revenue, and managing a large expenditure 
programme in agricultural development and social policy. A soul-searching 
‘national debate’ on the agricultural sector organised in 1982 took stock of 
the unsustainability of development plans, and the government approached 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial relief. By the end of 
decade, public investment had been reduced to around 9 per cent of GDP. 
The impact of neoliberal reform can also be measured in the evolution 
of the structure of GDP. In the first two decades of independence (1960–
80), the growth input of the primary and tertiary sectors (the latter, largely 
dominated by the so-called informal economy, and more generally controlled 
by unproductive commercial capital) went down from a combined 82 per 
cent of GDP in 1960 to 42 per cent (primary sector) and 35 per cent (tertiary 
sector) 20 years later, with much of the de-growth occurring in the period 
1975–81. Meanwhile, the secondary sector had grown to 23 per cent. If it 
had been possible to sustain this trend at a regular pace, Niger would have 
joined the ranks of so-called transitional economies by the early 2000s. As a 
result of the end of public investment, the primary and tertiary sector – and 
their insignificant wealth creation capacities – have gone up again while the 
secondary sector now fluctuates at around 4 to 5 per cent of GDP. 
The stunted evolution has also put the Nigerien social contract in 
disarray. In the early independence period (1960–74), the elite class of 
the commis14 had taken over a state that was supported by the peasantry 
through commercial agriculture and taxation. The commis legitimised their 
rule through the development agenda, to be achieved through their mastery 
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of modern science. By ruining agriculture – and literally decimating the 
peasantry – the great drought-cum-famine of the early 1970s seemed to 
upend the elite class’s legitimacy and in any case put an end to the social 
contract of the country’s First Republic (as the PPN’s rule is formally known 
in Niger). Uranium, however, provided the basis for a successor social 
contract, whereby the specific distinction of the elite class (the mastery of 
modern science) was still serving the state, but for the more wholesome 
benefit of a now unexploited peasantry. The thinking15 was that since 
drought and famine had shown that the peasantry could not contribute to 
development (let alone support the state) until agriculture had been radically 
transformed through higher productivity, the proceeds of uranium should 
be used to effect that transformation. After the debt crisis nipped this plan 
in the bud, structural adjustment did not propose an alternative solution. 
It destroyed the position of the elite class, both materially (layoffs following 
restructuration of state services) and symbolically (it was no longer in 
control of the development project that, despite its failings, still legitimised 
its leadership). When Niger democratised in 1991, the country no longer 
had a working social contract – that is, a specific relation of accountability 
between the ruling class and those being ruled. This was an inauspicious 
introduction to democratic reform.
The economic policy of neoliberal reform in this case was externally 
enforced austerity.16 It would be properly described as a method of creating 
an acceptance of the reality of ‘under-development’: lacking the financial 
capacities for jumpstarting a process of economic transformation, the state 
simply had to be cut down to size and let things follow their ‘natural’ market-
led course. The entire apparatus set in place to engineer the transformation 
of agriculture was thus gradually scaled down and phased out. By 1991–92, 
its two pillars, the agricultural credit institution Caisse Nationale de Crédit 
Agricole and the national development bank were both gone, which led to 
the rapid collapse of the cooperative system put in place in the early 1960s 
to create a policy space for the state in the rural areas. 
Parallel to this process, budget cuts starving the country’s sole university 
of credits had led to student unrest.17 After an incident in February 1990 
that caused three deaths among students, the regime became reluctant to 
use repression, folded and gave way to a democratisation process (Summer 
1991) led by the leaders of burgeoning political movements, unions and 
student organisations. The objective was vocally that of democratic reform 
directed against structural adjustment. A slogan then popular on the streets 
of Niamey (Niger’s capital) was the alliterative French-language phrase ‘Le 
PAS ne passera pas’.18 At this juncture, there were elements of political 
will and popular agency at work, but the latter, only faintly. The driving 
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actors of the democratic reform movement belonged to the elite class of the 
country, and this shows that political will was distinctly more important 
than popular agency. And while democratisation initially put a break on 
structural adjustment, the endemic fiscal crisis led the new leaders of the state 
of Niger to relent by 1995 and to accept further retrenchment, especially 
since international aid – which, after the fall of uranium, had become the 
principal source of revenue – grew increasingly tied to agreements with the 
IMF and the World Bank, the two armed hands of neoliberal reform.
While in theory, these institutions only advocated economic 
liberalisation, in practice they insisted on a radical makeover of the state 
system. By the late 1990s, this was effectively achieved. In 1999, when 
the first government of the fully ‘neoliberalised’ state of Niger – the 
government of President Mamadou Tandja, 1999–200919 – took office, 
the state of Niger had a thinner system, limited to government apparatus, 
basic administration and defence and security. Such a system essentially 
removed it from society and erased the complexes of organisations 
which used to determine responsiveness and policy formulation and 
implementation in the past. To ensure a modicum of governance, 
decentralisation was adopted in 1998: local communities could elect their 
own home governments, which could collect smaller taxes than national policy 
would have demanded. Though dramatically substandard, local government 
is cheaper, and is something Niger’s indigenous peasants could afford. 
Hence, the Nigerien leader who got himself voted as the head of the state 
after 1998 was no longer heading the same state as those in the previous era. 
In particular, he would have at his disposal far fewer tools and apparatuses 
for developing and conducting policy. Since the state system is a unit, 
changes in some component parts affect the entire functioning of the unit. 
Thus, not all state organisations were eliminated by neoliberal reform, but 
their overall policy impact was modified and, in general, reduced by the 
disappearance of suppressed entities.20 
In the mining sector, the above-mentioned ONAREM existed until 
2007, when it was divided into two distinct entities, one in charge of its duty 
of overseeing the mining interests of the state (the Société du Patrimoine des 
Mines du Niger, SOPAMIN) and the other succeeding to its prospection 
mission (the Centre pour l’Exploration Géologique et Minière, CRGM). 
SOPAMIN and CRGM, together with a mining code adopted in 2006, 
underline the continued hopes which the state of Niger invests in mining 
as the primary source of public funds. But as we have seen, this reliance 
dates back to 1974 and was initially part of a project which had organised 
state power in certain specific ways to achieve its aims. Three decades later, 
after neoliberal reform, this emphasis on mining revenue had become an 
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orphan strategy, even though the Nigerien state finds it must still pursue it. 
Thus, upon taking office, Tandja and his government immediately focused 
on increasing mining revenue. As various officials told this researcher, his 
party had come to power in a world where ‘there [were] no friends, only 
interests’.21 Aid is volatile and conditioned to often unrealistic prescriptions 
and expectations, and increased taxation remains a problematic proposition 
in the conditions of Niger.22 Increasing revenue from mining, on the other 
hand, could finance a degree of state autonomy. The Nigerien Fifth Republic 
maintained excellent relations with the IMF and its leaders never appeared 
to reject neoliberal principles – in fact, its ruling party, the Mouvement 
National pour la Société de Développement, tended to present itself as a 
‘liberal’ party, in the French sense of the word (i.e., economic, not political/
social). But state autonomy was sought for two interrelated reasons: first, 
the ability to arrange public spending in ways that would help the prospects 
for re-election of the president; and second, the latter was a member of 
the military junta that tried to spur the transformation of agriculture in 
the 1980s, and he explicitly wanted to revive that policy, at least in part. 
Significantly, however, Tandja did not resort, in pursuance of this double 
goal, to amending the state system. Instead, he used a non-institutional mode 
of action popularised by aid regimes, putting in place a so-called ‘special 
programme’ of the President of the Republic – a fundraising outfit which 
both enhanced his personal prestige and channelled money into projects 
targeting the agricultural sector and the ‘monde rural’ (‘rural population’). 
As his attempt at overturning the constitution and restoring autocracy in 
late 2009 clearly shows, Tandja’s project was far from a democratic reform 
of the state. He strongly identified with Niger’s elite class, using the ‘special 
programme’ in a framework of evergetism that enhanced his elite stature, 
and reserving the discussion of issues of central relevance to the state to 
members of the elite class. He said as much in a televised speech where, after 
glorying in his paternal care for the hungry peasants of Niger, he concluded: 
‘As for important topics, such as the issue of uranium, of petroleum, they 
do not concern those poor people.’23 The rhetoric of care for the peasantry 
has been a staple of Niger’s elite class since the commis of the 1960s, but in 
the neoliberal era, it no longer corresponds to a structure of responsibility 
such as the one evidenced by the social contracts that existed under the First 
Republic and the military regime. 
Such specious elite views, non-institutional modes of action and the 
temptation of autocracy – underlined by a greater reliance on the repressive 
functions of the state24 – are at least strongly stimulated by the neoliberal 
state system if not caused by it. A parsimonious system with little direct 
connections to society is hence better controlled by and for the advantage of 
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the elite class. With many fewer public institutions, it leaves extensive room 
for non-institutional manipulations that sidestep the need for democratic 
accountability. In such a context, it appears natural to argue that the more 
‘important’ issues are not the concern of the people. If the case of Tandja 
provides a vivid illustration of the exercise of power in a neoliberal state 
system, it should not be construed as an isolated instance of the fact. After 
Tandja was removed in 2010, the Nigerien political class which, in its 
majority, had opposed his attempt at autocratic restoration, tried to rekindle 
the process of democratic reform of politics which started in 1991 and had 
run into the sand of neoliberalism.25 A new constitution adopted in 2011 
legislated strong legal protections for journalists and opposition figures, 
casting opprobrium on the repression of the Tandja era. Language in both 
the constitution and the political programme of the Parti Nigérien pour la 
Démocratie et le Socialisme (PNDS), which won the elections, indicted 
autocracy and called for the strengthening of democratic institutions. 
Unlike in previous Nigerien constitutions, the framers of this one went out 
of their way to name and reject ‘dictatorship’ as a form of government, 
while the first point of the PNDS’s (2011) programme insists that ‘Niger 
needs strong institutions rather than strong men’, stressing that ‘strong, 
creditable and sustainable democratic institutions’ must be built to protect 
the ‘respectability’ of ‘the republic’.26 
The stance implies that the PNDS government, unlike its predecessor, 
demonstrates a degree of political will toward democratic reform. If its 
criticism of neoliberalism is not strident, it certainly also quietly guides its 
key actions. In a deliberately anti-Hayekian move, the new government 
resurrected, in its first cabinet, the Ministry of Planning that was an early 
casualty of neoliberal reform in the 1990s. The public sector soon thereafter 
went on a veritable recruitment binge. In the first two years of its tenure, 
the PNDS government hired over 30,000 people in the public sector, 
significantly more than the entire private sector (over 22,000 recruits) – 
and also more than the MNSD (Mouvement National pour la Société 
du Développement) government during much of its ten-year tenure.27 In 
particular, it offered positions in provincial and rural health units to all new 
medicine graduates who applied to serve the state while also ramping up 
the provision of state scholarships to students. Given the systemic nature 
of state action, these and other moves of the PNDS can, however, achieve 
their aims only if they succeed in transcending the neoliberal state system 
that has solidified in Niger since the mid-1990s. In my hypothesis – derived 
from the conceptual framework described in the first section of this article 
– this would be possible only as a result of a successful democratic reform 
of the state, insofar as this specific reform agenda has been the historical 
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antagonist of neoliberal reform. Are the elements of such a democratic 
reform of the state – political will, popular agency, common programme 
and transformative institutions – present enough in today’s Niger to sustain 
a shift in that direction? The question posed in this way can obviously receive 
no straightforward response, especially in the short space of this article, and 
what I propose here is to end this exploration of the Nigerien case with the 
‘important topic’ of mining as a way to approaching the aforementioned 
four elements.
As previously noted, under the Fifth Republic, there were renewed efforts 
at increasing mining revenue. Niger’s mining law was revised in 2006, raising 
royalty rates for larger exploitations from 5.5 to 12 per cent. However, if the 
new rule applied to petroleum – which had come online in the late 2000s – the 
biggest prize, uranium, held by French industry giant Areva NC, was shielded 
at the time from the new levy by the fact that the contract tying Areva to the 
state of Niger would expire only in 2013.28  Not only did Areva continue to 
pay low-end royalties to Niger, it also kept the generous fiscal exemptions 
and related benefits it had inherited from the previous mining law, adopted 
in 1993. In 2013, when Areva needed to negotiate an extension contract, it 
faced a PNDS government that had hedged its bets for the revival of state-led 
development on increased revenue from the mining sector. Indeed, while in 
2000 the sector contributed only 5.5 billion CFA francs to state revenue, by 
2007 it was contributing over 82 billion – an incredible 14-fold increase in 
just over six years.29  The vagaries of commodity markets have since brought 
this down several notches – still, always above 50 billion – but if uranium 
– by far Niger’s choicest mineral riches – were to pay high-end royalties as 
legislated in 2006, the impact on state revenue would be quite dramatic. 
Areva resisted this. The company had signed the expired contract under the 
law of 1993, an investor-friendly piece of legislation from a time when foreign 
capital was snubbing the country’s mines. On the other hand, its mining titles 
were secured in 1968 for 75 years. In 2003, WAEMU put out a community 
mining code which guaranteed ‘fiscal stability’ for the duration of mining 
titles in member countries. Claiming that community law supersedes national 
law, Areva argued that, as per WAEMU’s regulations, the exemptions and tax 
breaks it received in 1993 should last until 2043 – that is, 75 years after 1968, 
the duration of its mining titles. 
The ensuing showdown between Areva and the state of Niger – and 
more generally, Niger’s relationships with mining companies – has mobilised 
sections of the populace in support of the state’s positions in the protracted 
negotiations. Outwardly, the mobilisation was concentrated in civil society 
and the student union, and geographically limited to the capital and the 
northern city of Agadez. However, it ended up extending into the written 
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press, social media, and both television and radio debates and editorials, 
including and especially in ‘national languages’, in a country where only about 
10 per cent of the population use the official language (French). For the first 
time in Niger’s history, uranium and other mining interests thus became a 
topic of discussion among ‘the poor people’ (to quote Tandja’s nonchalant 
phrase). Demonstrations were strategically directed at the media – including 
the international media, which have an echo in France – even though the aim 
commonly agreed upon by leaders of civil society organisations and unions 
involved was to maintain pressure on the government of Niger. But it also 
became manifest that the Nigerien government hardly needed prodding and 
was intent on modifying the terms on which Areva exploits Niger’s uranium. 
Additional demands required Areva to rebuild transport infrastructure and, 
more importantly, to cede to Niger the control of Cominak and Somaïr, 
the two companies from which the state draws shareholder dividends – a 
move which amounts to a renegotiation, if not a rejection, of the entente that 
underlies Areva’s operations in Niger since 1968.30  The consensus on the issue 
also extended to the opposition parties, and if the Areva negotiation was still 
a current story at the time of writing, it is in fact only a sequence in Niger’s 
struggle to redefine its mining policy.
So there is clearly a congruence of political will and popular agency on 
this particular issue. To be sure, popular agency is here outwardly limited to 
the elite class. Mine workers have remained quiescent and the popular classes, 
both urban and rural, only comment and observe. Given the historical context 
described at some length in this section, however, the meaning of this episode 
is easier to interpret. Niger’s natural resources do not belong in the major 
league in their categories. While uranium is abundant and of high quality, it is 
also difficult to export given the distance to the sea – nearly 2,500 kilometres – 
and the worsening security situation in the country’s desert north. Regarding 
petroleum, with only 20,000 barrels a day, Niger counts among the smallest 
producers in Africa. And gold, produced in Western Niger, is far more volatile 
in value than either uranium or oil. But Niger’s experience has shown that 
the surplus capital needed to jumpstart the process of development can come 
neither from taxation, nor from agriculture (in its current state) – while aid 
(at least Western aid) is tied to austerity prescriptions, which do not aim at 
transforming the economy. Thus, the mining rent appears as the state’s only 
remaining option, especially as it seeks to revive the state-led development 
project disallowed by neoliberal reform. The desire to hold on to power 
(Tandja), or a more ideological intention at reforming the state (Issoufou), 
have created political will to redefine Niger’s mining policy to the advantage 
of the state. This political will is supported by popular agency – limited to the 
elite class – and quieter popular support from other classes of Nigerien society. 
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However, this has not led to an agreed-upon reform programme. There 
is clearly elite class consensus around the notion that capital from mining rent 
– together with the investment and lending that it would attract – would 
rekindle Niger’s social contract and ultimately re-establish the legitimacy 
of the elite class as the country’s ruling class. But this consensus does not 
appear to crystallise into a reform programme that would also associate the 
other classes in the Nigerien polity. If it limits itself to shoring up elite rule, 
as it appears to be doing, it is safe to say the PNDS’s thrust – or pledge – 
to institutionalise democracy in Niger will make only trivial dents in the 
neoliberal state system of the country.
West Bengal: Renouncing Political Will
The case of India is very different from Niger. Even leaving aside the size and 
complexity differentials (India is more comparable perhaps to Africa than to 
a sub-unit of Africa such as Niger), in the spectrum of structural economic 
transformation, or development as it were, Niger lies at an initial point – 
with Bolivia further ahead, but closer to Niger than to India – while India 
is now largely a transitional economy. If the main concern of the state of 
Niger is primary capital extraction from natural resources, the Indian state 
coordinates capital-intensive industrialisation and is faced with the problem 
of redistribution; and while Niger’s sociology is a comparatively simple one 
(simpler, certainly, than in the pre-colonial era), India’s is much harder to chart 
with the required tact and accuracy, given in particular the fact that caste and 
culture play an important role alongside class. Sticking to a class framework, 
it can be said that India has three key class-groupings: the monopoly (now 
corporate) capitalist and big bourgeoisie layers; the rural gentry and closely 
linked small bourgeoisie; and the masses of the toiling people, in town, 
country and forest.31  In this way, the underlying story of India’s evolution 
broadly lends itself to the conceptual framework set out in the first section of 
this article, and the fact that India is so different from Niger is a good test of 
its relative worth as an analytical tool for the purposes of this article.
More than in the case of the Nigerien state, the product largely of the 
independence era, key functional elements of the Indian state were created 
during the colonial period. That was especially the case of those elements 
which neoliberal reform tends to preserve: basic administration, defence 
and security. The colonial government needed economic order and security 
for the sake of imperial investors. Given the vital importance of India to the 
imperial economy of Britain, these requisites had the benefit of providing 
India with good basic state institutions by independence.32  Also, it was 
under British domination that the class distribution of modern India – as 
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distinct from the one extant in the Mughal and Rajput period – gradually 
took shape, leading to an early independence social contract where, similar 
to what we have seen in Niger, the modern-educated elite seized control of 
the state in the name of development. 
The large internal economy of India and its more complex class distribution 
complicated this, however. In particular, not only were the interests of the 
propertied and popular classes distinct, there were also significant differences 
among the propertied classes, with differing interpretations of the meaning 
and implication of development. The early development policies of the 
Indian state show, at any rate, that the preferred model was state-led, and the 
dedication of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to parliamentary 
democracy also ensured that this state-led model of development was not to 
be authoritarian as in much of the Global South at the time. The state ramped 
up its power, built infrastructures and formulated an industrial policy as well 
as an agricultural intensification policy that led to a ‘green revolution’ toward 
the end of the 1960s. These mainstays of development policy would satisfy the 
propertied classes, while populist programmes undertaken especially under 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966–77) directed state patronage toward the 
poor. Indira Gandhi also used the power of the state to expand credit and 
savings into the rural areas and through the country’s large ‘informal’ sector 
(bank nationalisations of 1969).33 All of these policies, though serving chiefly 
the propertied classes, sometimes at the expenses of the popular classes,34  had 
real overall transformative potentials and (in some cases) effects. 
The Indian model ran however into a crisis of transition by the mid-
1960s. While the propertied classes had successfully replaced – with the 
indispensable help of the state – imperial capitalists through the first 
decade of independence, the next stage was to successfully compete with 
international capitalists to avoid being consigned to a peripheral and menial 
position in the world economy. Also, without transition, India’s vast poor 
population was feeling more acutely the brunt of exploitation and neglect. 
The transition crisis not only generated a conflict within the ruling class – 
between those who tied their ideal of prosperity to a state-protected internal 
market and those who wanted the state to open up the country – but it also 
happened in a difficult context, both nationally and internationally (in the 
late 1960s, drought and famine, war with Pakistan, and currency instability; 
in the 1970s, the oil shocks and recession). The transition crisis translated 
politically into a crisis of the state and of parliamentary democracy through 
much of the 1970s. While a fragmented and weak political opposition 
failed to defeat Indira Gandhi at the polls, she turned toward so-called 
‘pragmatic’ policies, which no longer reflected the choices of the now 
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deeply divided ruling classes, but essentially seemed to strengthen her 
hold on power. Economically, those were inadequate policies, fostering a 
corrupt status quo35  and increasing dissatisfaction in the ruling classes. The 
latter phenomenon took several forms, including a high-minded defence 
of democracy by the elderly socialist Jayaprakash Narayan in 1975–76, but 
mostly, the objective became to put an end to Gandhi’s rule. Lashing out 
against her opponents during the state of emergency she had proclaimed 
in June 1975, Gandhi succeeded in uniting their political representatives 
in the motley Janata Party, which beat her at the polls in 1977. But the 
economic situation only further deteriorated – in part because the Janata 
Party proved incapable of backing the policies of its ablest Prime Minister, 
Charan Singh (1979–80) – and Gandhi returned to power in January 1980.
In the changed conditions of the 1980s, Gandhi – imitated after her 
assassination in 1984 by her successors – started reorienting the state 
toward market liberalisation. This was announced – indirectly – in both 
the Industrial Policy Statement of July 1980 and the Sixth Five-Year Plan, 
which showed a new willingness to stimulate the transition of the Indian 
economy into international levels of competitiveness. Measures linking 
industrial growth to export performance were taken in diverse policy areas, 
and were poised to expand corporate capitalism, even if in limited ways. 
Some incoherence marked those policies, where exports ended up being 
absorbed by domestic demand and where liberalisation spurred both a 
costly – in terms of balance of payments – import of capital goods and the 
transformation of state-protected monopoly capitalism into international-
allied monopoly capitalism, among other policy miscarriages.36  Overall, 
however, they were not a failure from the point of view of policy-makers. 
They managed to expand the scope of corporate capitalism without 
undermining the state system. Liberalisation was a means toward the end 
of the transition to higher industrialisation, which was still to be organised 
by the state. Thus, the fiscal crisis resulting from the policy incoherencies of 
the 1980s, though apparently similar to the one which destroyed the fragile 
economies of Bolivia and Niger in the early 1980s, became here the pretext 
for using that instrument (liberalisation) more freely. 
Indeed, in the case of India, a radical break that could be characterised as 
‘neoliberal reform’ did not occur. The break, if such it was, came in 1980,37 
when market liberalisation became a key policy option for the Indian state, and 
when segments of the industrial sector emerged or grew thanks to its decisions. 
This in turn made possible some of the reforms developed in the 1990s, both 
technically and – more importantly – politically. While the central Indian 
governments of the 1990s may well have harboured neoliberal reformers,38 it 
remains that neoliberal reform as a package could not easily be implemented in 
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the context of a country where the ruling classes had recognised the pacifying 
value of the democratic process – certainly after the troubles of the late 1970s 
– and where there was no firm consensus among them on neoliberalism. How 
then are we to characterise what happened in India after 1991?
The balance of payments crisis had to be solved, and this was done 
chiefly by drastically reducing public investment. The general effect of 
the market liberalisation initiative, combined with this decline in public 
investment, expanded the power of corporate capital as an agent in the 
Indian development model. Moreover, the central state’s activism was 
reduced across the country, giving that much salience to regional disparities, 
as responsibilities for development were gradually offloaded onto individual 
states. (This process is akin, in a more informal way, to the decentralisation 
reform seen in the case of Niger.) On the other hand, despite the continuing 
– yet still modest – opening up of the economy to international market 
forces, the measured pace of neoliberal-style reforms has preserved the 
coherence of the internal economy and the dominance of national industry 
actors. What was accomplished by the reforms was to put India’s wealth – 
land, labour, government work – at the service of those actors through the 
steady but disparate birthing of a market economy – the neoliberal concept 
of development as it were – across the country. The state-led development 
model has, in this way, lost most of its significance, but it has not been 
straightforwardly replaced by neoliberal reform (as in Niger or Bolivia). 
Rather, it is now left to individual states within the Union to define – in 
accordance with regional conditions – the uses to which they would put the 
liberalisation instrument, in a context where competition to attract private 
investment greatly constrains or reduces their choices. It is this ambiguous 
situation that I now propose to explore by engaging in an exercise similar 
to the one conducted with the Nigerien case: that is, approaching the issue 
through a single revealing event – here, the transfer of a car plant from 
West Bengal to Gujarat – and assess thereby the implications for democratic 
reform in the case country.
The short story is this: in the early 2000s, Tata Motors, an Indian market 
giant, created stiff competition among states for receiving the site of the 
plant for its new project, the ‘Nano’ a cheap mini-car with the famously 
low price tag of ‘one lakh’ (100,000 rupees or US$2,300), designed for 
India’s struggling majority population. West Bengal beat the competition 
by leasing land to the company in Singur, a small rural town in the vicinity 
of state capital, Kolkata. The land, intended to host both the car plant and 
its ancillaries in an industrial complex, was expropriated from farmers using 
an abusive interpretation of eminent domain law, and cash compensation. 
Some of the farmers protested, first in the courts (where they lost their case), 
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then on the streets, causing repression and the intervention of a coalition of 
rights-defending organisations and individuals, as well as that of opposition 
politicians. Given the turmoil and violence, Tata Motors reviewed its options 
and, in October 2008, was invited into Gujarat by an SMS from that state’s 
Chief Minister, Narendra Modi (now the country’s Prime Minister). Gujarat 
offered land already occupied by the state at Sanand to the ‘Nano’ project, 
thus avoiding controversy.
The event has been abundantly analysed and commented on by Indian 
scholars.39 I am here interested in two aspects of what had transpired at that 
point: the attitudes of actors in West Bengal relative to the Tata project and 
the underlying idea of development behind its support by the West Bengal 
government; and a comparison of these attitudes with the Sanand denouement.
The West Bengal state was run at the time by the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) (CPI-M), which of course inspired no end of irony owing 
to the fact that it had courted a market giant while trampling on the rural 
proletariat. This is all the more curious since CPI-M, which, by then, had 
been in power in Kolkata uninterruptedly for 31 years, had grounded its 
hegemony in rural supremacy. The scholarly consensus on this subject is that 
CPI-M in West Bengal had created stability at the expense of development. 
More specifically, since the late 1970s, the party had successfully displaced 
the larger landowning classes – favourable to Congress – and brought about a 
West Bengal of smallholders, including through ‘Operation Barga’, a policy of 
land reform which secured the rights of sharecroppers against rich landowners. 
These actions provided a stable basis for the party’s dominance in the majority 
poor population of the state. At the same time, West Bengal was, however, 
also taken into the general Indian dilemma of transition to a higher stage of 
development which had started to brew in the country in the 1970s. 
In this case, the lack of development was directly connected to the 
hegemonic structure of CPI-M, since a system of smallholding, largely 
subsistence agriculture, can hardly provide the surplus capital needed for 
starting such a process (compare to Niger). As a result, large sections of the 
peasantry suffered a process of marginalisation, while even the beneficiaries 
of CPI-M policies were confronted with the limitations of stagnant 
development. Democratic reform might have provided a solution through 
the ideal combination of political will and popular agency leading to 
transformative institutions, and this was clearly what was envisaged by the 
reform of the Panchayat (rural government) system in 1983. Not only was 
the new Panchayat Act adopted that year destined to better organise popular 
agency at local levels, it also aimed at providing the institutional space the 
state needed to implement its rural development policies (including the 
then on-going Operation Barga). But as the instability created by economic 
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stagnation increased, the party also increasingly resorted to patronage and 
intimidation – rather than to democratic practice – to maintain its hold 
on power, an objective which eventually became paramount.40 By the 
early 2000s, the CPI-M was moving toward neoliberal reform in order 
to attract private capital, arguing that ‘land reform was not an end in 
itself and industrialisation was necessary for moving into the next phase 
of development’.41 The key implication here is that the party had decided 
to give up on the transformation of agriculture – which, from a political 
point of view, would have entailed democratic reform – and opted to climb 
onto the national bandwagon of corporate-led development.42 From this 
perspective, its mistreatment of smallholders is logical, although it was 
also self-defeating. Indeed, all analysts are agreed that the population of 
Singur was not hostile to the Tata project, and many among them expected 
to profit from industrial work and attendant business. However, they did 
not understand this to mean that agricultural work needed to be forfeited 
altogether. The underlying concept of development for the rural poor 
combined the relative security of agriculture – relative to potential salaried 
jobs – to the relative opportunities of industry, while the government in 
fact viewed agriculture and industry as opposites because, in the existing 
scheme of things (which it was principally responsible for creating), the 
latter produced capital, and the former did not.
The situation in West Bengal was therefore this: there was no political 
will for democratic reform among the rulers of the state at that point;43 yet 
there was much popular agency, both among the smallholders and the petite 
bourgeoisie that staffed civil society; a reform programme could not take 
form in the absence of the political will factor and potentially transformative 
institutions (Panchayats, Ministry of Land and Land Reforms) remained 
therefore in a state of inaction. In Gujarat, the state took over the Tata project 
and the process went down quietly. There is no space here to engage into an 
effective comparison between the two processes, but the Gujarat case might 
well show that, within the larger framework of corporate-led development 
that emerged from the liberalisations of the 1980–90s, differing forms 
of appropriation of the model are possible, and it is perhaps right-wing 
Gujarat that swerved farther away from the orthodox neoliberal approach 
– although, certainly using another method than democratic reform. In the 
case of West Bengal, the people eventually voted the CPI-M out in 2011, 
replacing it by a coalition led by the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), 
the party of Mamata Bannerjee. One of her first decisions was to organise 
the vote of a law that would return 400 acres of land to the unwilling farmers 
of Singur, but Tata – which still holds the lease – has successfully resisted the 
law at both West Bengal’s High Court and India’s Supreme Court. 
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Conclusion
Despite the received wisdom of the mainstream literature in political science, 
the coincidence of the ‘third wave’ of democratisations and the ‘second wave’ 
of economic liberalism was a misfortune for democracy. The mainstream 
literature generally assumes that neoliberal reform and democracy are 
mutually sustaining, and that roadblocks to democracy are to be found in a 
country’s internal factors, a conclusion preordained by the premise. Indeed, 
since, in this view, democracy and neoliberal capitalism are the two faces 
of the same coin, the notion that neoliberalism may be one such hurdle 
is essentially meaningless. Moreover, since neoliberalism is bound up with 
globalisation, there is a clear reluctance to stress the negative role of external 
factors, such as the agendas of multilateral organisations or the strategic 
operations of Western powers.44 By looking at a single historical process, 
such as the reform of the state, in which competing forces representative of 
democratisation and neoliberalism can be shown to be at work, this ‘internal/
external factors’ debate can be displaced by a more fruitful comparison. For 
in studying the effects of two divergent reform agendas of the state, we are 
comparing effective processes, not biased conjectures.  
On this score, it is obviously fair to say that in the poorer countries of 
the South, the democratic reform of the state was meant to strengthen it, 
not weaken it. The intention was that the overhauled strength of a reformed 
state could be put to work on development, on the basis of participation 
from all classes of society, instead of being used and misused by the small 
cliques that profited from authoritarian rule. And it is equally fair to say 
that neoliberal reform, on the other hand, sought to weaken the state and 
let competition in the marketplace determine winners and losers, with no 
demonstrated concern for the society that people form under a state. The 
comparison between Niger and India (and, arguably, that between West 
Bengal and Gujarat within India) reveals that in this struggle, the neoliberal 
has tended to gain the upper-hand, and it is here that the study shows 
that we may put the stress on internal factors. If democracy was essentially 
promoted by internal forces, and neoliberalism by external ones, the relative 
defeat of democracy should primarily be explained by failings from the 
(internal) forces that supported it. In this study, such failings have been 
analysed through an interpretive outline derived from Bolivian history, and 
a longer study could delve into the living details of how the outline worked 
in each case, what caused success, and what prompted failure. 
Another major conclusion of the study indicates that neoliberal reform 
especially weakened the weaker – Niger rather than India and, within India, 
West Bengal rather than Gujarat. And finally, given that democratic reform 
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is in fact the antagonist of neoliberal reform when it comes to the state 
and to development, one may conjecture that only by embracing it could 
countries that have been subjected to the neoliberal regimen transcend 
their predicament. Further research in both reform agendas – their social 
conditions, political implications and economic parameters – is however 
needed to effectively understand both the theory and the practice of 
democratic reform. Such understanding, I believe, is much needed.
Notes
  1. The best case in point is perhaps that of South Korea, an economic ‘miracle’ under 
the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, but also a political impasse, leading to the 
massive instability of the late 1970s that included the assassination of Park (1979), 
the Gwangju massacre (1980) and its fractious aftermath. Only democratic reform 
ultimately gave the country a way out many years later. 
  2. Among the cases studied in this paper, Bolivia is a poster child of the first age of 
economic liberalism. It embraced the policy early on, under the presidency of Linares 
(1857–61) and became one of its major victims following the Great Depression. 
  3. Of course, the mainstream literature in political science holds the exact opposite to be 
true. During the heyday of the ‘third wave’, well-respected authors Diamond, Linz and 
Lipset, writing on the countries of the Global South, thus claimed that ‘all democracies 
… are to some degree capitalist; production and distribution of goods are determined 
mainly by competition in the market, rather than by the state, and there is significant 
private ownership of the means of production’ (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1989: xxi). 
Over thirty years later, the same pronouncement was repeated unblinkingly by Leon 
(2010): ‘All liberal democracies are also market-oriented economies.’ 
  4. This is glowingly described by Albro as ‘for now the culmination of a long process … 
to shape the postcolonial terms of political participation, which has been historically 
defined by the profound marginalization of its indigenous and popular majority’. 
Quoted from ‘Confounding Cultural Citizenship’, p. 71. 
  5. See Wolf (2013).
  6. ‘After the referendum’, Mesa had told the daily La Nacion, ‘the state has recovered an 
important degree of legitimacy’. Quoted in The Free Library/South American Political 
and Economic Affairs, an online resource.
  7. ‘It was a state of vast reach’, write Arze and Kruse (2004: 24), ‘playing a central role 
not only in capital formation and allocation but also employment. It was a provider 
of services and the focus of social demands, making itself present as never before in 
people’s daily lives and the agendas of social struggle.’ 
  8. This includes COB which, though a union federation, was deeply unmeshed with 
the revolutionary state, its main leader, Juan Lechín, being First Minister of Mines 
and Petroleum, and then vice-president in 1960–64. 
  9. For a well-rounded presentation of the effects of this third role of ‘the state of ’52’, 
see Klein (2011). 
10. See Malloy (1970). 
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11. In their paper, Arze and Kruse note, for instance, that ‘the second administration of 
President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada … killed more people in 14 months than did 
Gen. Hugo Bánzer’s seven-year military dictatorship’ (2004: 23), which was noted 
for its peculiar brutality. 
12. Kohl’s review of MAS ‘governance’ (i.e., state action) stresses several parameters 
of a ‘chaotic style of governance’ (2010: 113) that especially denote the fact that 
this type of institution-building is either very slow to emerge, or altogether not 
forthcoming in today’s Bolivia. This may be partly related to the emphasis on the 
concept of ‘cultural identity’, which has played a far greater role in MAS’s popular 
agency than in MNR’s. Some scholars – generally sympathetic to neoliberal reform 
– consider this a welcome change from class identification (see Haarstad and 
Andersson 2009), ignoring that emphasis on cultural identity does not preclude, 
and may indeed reinforce, class identification – especially in a conservative fashion: 
but maybe they know this all too well!
13. See the long theoretical preamble – a veritable essay – of the National Charter adopted 
to this effect in 1987. The Charter, write the authors of the Historical Dictionary of 
Niger, ‘defined the development society, the concept of the state, and the organization 
of the executive councils tasked with the mission of pushing the country forward 
using rules for (the motto went) ‘consultation, dialogue and participation’.
14. From a French word meaning ‘clerk’ or ‘civil servant’ depending on the context. 
During the colonial period, the commis occupied clerical positions in government 
and business, and became the slim buffer class between the colonial rulers and the 
African population, developing a lifestyle closer to that of the Europeans and essentially 
growing into a local bourgeoisie after independence. In Niger, the PPN was the party 
of the commis, which came to power upon defeating – mostly through fraud and 
violence – the Sawaba party, a leftist formation that represented the country’s semi-
urban proletariat of the talakawa (‘little folks’). See Van Walraven (2013).  
15. This is mostly found in the grey literature of ministry reports and consultancy 
documents. The narrative part of this analysis is based on documentation graciously 
provided by the Niamey-based Bureau Nigérien d’Etudes et de Conseil en 
Développement Rural, as well as on interviews with officials from the agriculture 
ministry, both former and current. See also Raynaut’s (1999) introduction to Politique 
Africaine’s special issue on Niger. 
16. See Gervais (1992; 1995) who interprets this as a story of Niger dragging its feet to 
implement much needed reforms.  
17. Students – as well as civil servants – were routinely singled out in the neoliberal literature 
of the time as the enemies of ‘reform’, which they would oppose in view of keeping 
their ‘privileges’. See, for Niger, especially the work of Gervais (1992; 1995; 1997).     
18. Literally, ‘SAP [structural adjustment programmes] will not come to pass’. For an 
early analysis of such democratic resistance to neoliberal reform, see Beckman (1991). 
19. Tandja remained in office nearly two months after the expiry of his second term, 
in December 2009, and had to be forcibly removed from power by the army in 
February 2010. 
20. For a full analysis of the rationale of neoliberal reform of state institutions in Africa, 
see Mkandawire (2009).
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21. This now very conventional wisdom in Niger – leaders of the student union 
repeated the same phrase during interviews – seems to encapsulate a (neoliberal) 
zeitgeist that stresses individualism and competitiveness, including with regard to 
inter-state relations.   
22. Increased taxation is the preferred avenue for revenue mobilisation in neoliberal reform, 
as is shown by prescriptions from both the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) and the IMF. The state of Niger is trying to comply, with limited 
success and the memory of the serious popular unrest that rocked the country after 
IMF-pushed tax hikes in 2005. 
23. From the Nigerien weekly La Roue de l’Histoire (2014). Interestingly enough, this was 
stated four years after his fall, which underlines the strength of his class beliefs.
24. One symbol of this was the establishment, in 2003, of the high security prison Koutou 
Kalé, in a craggy wilderness some 30 kilometres outside the capital. Though officially 
destined for ‘hardened criminals’, it soon became famous for hosting pesky journalists 
and troublesome opposition figures arrested on trumped-up charges or through harsh 
interpretations of the law. 
25. At that specific juncture, the events of 1991 received for the first time symbolic public 
recognition: a street was renamed after the National Conference of the summer 1991, 
and the sports hall in which it had convened was also given the name ‘palace of the 
sovereign national conference’ following a solemn christening ceremony.  
26. Constitution of Niger’s Seventh Republic, Preamble, and ‘Niger: La Renaissance. 
Programme PNDS Tarayya 2011’, p. 5. 
27. A recent investigation by this researcher among university graduates shows a newly-
expressed preference for public sector jobs, while until very recently all studies indicated 
preference for the private sector in that population. 
28. However, in order to grab a newly-found giant uranium deposit, the biggest in Africa, 
Areva accepted, in 2007, a 50 per cent increase in the kilo price paid to Niger.  
29. See the report commissioned in 2011 by the Niger branch of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, chapter II, ab initio (pages non-numbered). Online resource. 
30. Areva, which is 91 per cent owned by the French state, is a successor company to 
the constellation of French public institutions and enterprises that dealt with the 
fledgling state of Niger in the 1960s. France took control of Somaïr through aid, 
when the Nigerien state borrowed from its cooperation agency to buy its shares in the 
company. French control of Somaïr and Cominak in particular means that the state 
of Niger lacks intelligence in the commercialisation of the ore and the profitability 
of the companies, something which has constantly strengthened the French hand 
during negotiations.    
31. Inspired and adapted from ‘Indira Gandhi: an attempt at a political appraisal’, an 
anonymous (signed ‘K.B.’) essay in a 1985 issue of Economic and Political Weekly 
(‘K.B.’ 1985).   
32. For a summary, see Maddison (2006 [1971]).
33. This is of notable importance, contributing to creating India’s peculiarity as a poor 
country with large domestic savings – later useful for sustaining large-scale investments. 
34. This was especially visible during the building of large dams, which would necessitate 
land confiscation and the displacement of masses of people, who were generally poor. 
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35. This situation, characterised by disparaging phrases (‘Hindu rate of growth’, ‘license-
permit-quota-subsidy raj’, ‘political economy of stagnation’), was summed up by 
Mansingh as ‘a nexus among corrupt politicians, corrupt bureaucrats, and corrupt 
business houses’ (2006: 30). The paroxysm of Gandhi’s authoritarian tendencies was 
reached when she declared a state of emergency in June 1975. Writing in hindsight, 
Mansingh described the episode (which lasted 21 months) as an ‘aberrant … period 
of incipient authoritarianism’ (ibid.: 207), which is just what it was, although 
analysts pondering events at the time feared the worst (Kozicki 1975). For a rich 
contextualisation, see chapters 9 and 10 of Ananth (2010). 
36. See the detailed contemporary analysis of the new measures and their economic effects 
in Kurien (1989).
37. Here, there is agreement between Kohli (2006) and Corbridge Harriss and Jeffrey 
(2013). The latter also show the underlying continuities between what had gone on 
since the 1960s and what became possible after 1980.
38. Such would have been Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister in 2004–14 and Finance 
Minister in 1991. 
39. See in particular Sud (2008) to be read against the background of her earlier piece 
(Sud 2007); Roy (2011); Baumik (2011); and Kumar (2012).
40. See the analysis of Bandhyopadhyay and Dinda (2010: 10). 
41. ibid.: 14. 
42. Before the Singur debacle, the CPI-M had encountered a similar fiasco at Nandigram, 
in March 2007, when it tried to transfer farmland to the Indonesia-based Salim 
Group’s industrial project of a Special Economic Zone there. It did not learn from 
the episode. 
43. But perhaps there was some among the larger ruling classes, especially if we believe the 
claims of Mamata Bannerjee, then the major opposition figure, now Chief Minister 
and also Minister of Land and Land Reforms – the one potentially transformative 
institution for rural West Bengal. 
44.  The role of China in defeating the promotion of democracy, human rights and good 
governance is one exception in the more recent literature – for no obvious reason 
other than the fact that China is not a Western power, since the same behaviour, or 
even worse, is observable in American or French foreign policy, for instance. 
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